Thus, since 1997, the Armenian side has consistently backed down in the mediators` proposals. The same applies to the comparison of the Madrid principles in 2006 and 2009. Given the dramatic changes in the geopolitical situation in the region since 2008, it is also very likely that if Armenia rejects the current Madrid framework agreement, there will either be another proposal with a less good offer for the Armenians or a war waged by Azerbaijan to restore its claimed territorial integrity. Some changes in the geopolitical situation include the tragic events following the 1 March 2008 elections in Armenia and the lack of legitimacy of the authorities; the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008; a new status of Russian-American relationship with the “reset” button after the election of Barack Obama, which led to serious political disagreements in Russian-Iranian relations and Russia`s active participation in the nagging process of resolving conflicts between Nagorno-Karabakh; a wider gap between the military and economic potential of Armenia and Azerbaijan; and new oil and gas pipeline projects crossing Azerbaijan and the subsequent revitalization of the importance of their role in the region, with Armenia`s engagement remaining extremely low in almost all aspects mentioned above. These principles have been strongly criticized, both by Armenians and Azerbaijanis, for various reasons. In Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, several issues are highly controversial, including the width of the Lachin Corridor and the return of displaced persons and Azeri refugees to Nagorno-Karabakh, before their legal status is finally clarified. Armenians continue to believe that the concessions made by this agreement are detrimental to the national interests of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, perhaps the most worrying principle being that the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh would be determined by a referendum. In 2009, minor but significant changes were made to the text that replaces “the idea of a referendum or referendum to determine the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh” (OSCE, 2006) with “the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which in the future will be determined by an expression of legally binding will” (OSCE, 2010).